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Abstract
Whilst much of Europe is turning to supplier obligations in 
order to compel energy companies to deliver energy efficiency 
improvements, the UK, after 18 years of using such schemes, 
will from 2013 have a financing scheme as the central de-
livery mechanism, relying fully on the market rather than 
government intervention. The remaining supplier obliga-
tion will focus on the areas that financing is not expected to 
fully support: more expensive insulation and help for those 
with no access to finance. In addition, the publicly funded 
fuel poverty policy is to be terminated: for the first time since 
1978, there will be no taxpayer funded energy efficiency pro-
gramme for the most vulnerable. These changes represent 
the biggest shift in the history of energy efficiency policy in 
the UK since the first and second oil crisis. Yet, despite ap-
peals from many stakeholders, no period of transition will 
exist between the end of the current and the start of the new 
policies. The impact is likely to be stark: the expectation is for 
a dramatic reduction in the delivery of cost-effective energy 
efficiency measures leading to a big fall in employment and 
carbon reduction.
Plans for the supply-side are equally profound. In order to 
create a market with greater capacity and to encourage nuclear 
investment, the Government has unveiled plans for electric-
ity market reform (EMR). For renewable generators, EMR will 
mark a change in policy support, from a quantity-based green 
certificate mechanism (the Renewables Obligation) to a price-
based feed-in-tariff approach. In contrast to the approach on 
the demand-side, Government is allowing a three year transi-
tion between these schemes.
The paper outlines the reasons for the different approach-
es to policy continuity across the demand and supply side. It 
highlights what we see as key considerations for policy mak-
ers when planning a transition from a supplier obligation to a 
finance mechanism. We assess the implications of this shift in 
terms of carbon reduction effort, the industry and fuel poverty.
Introduction
Public policy is central to efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. In a market economy, public policy is typically used 
to create viable markets for greener interventions, or to regulate 
against the most polluting ones. In the UK, the Renewables 
Obligation (RO) and the Carbon Emission Reduction Target 
(CERT) are two programmes established by Government to 
create a market for renewable electricity and energy efficiency 
measures respectively. 
In response to such programmes, industry learns, adapts and 
deploys with the new marketplace, with the most profitable so-
lutions exploited. As the programme develops Government 
might make interventions to adjust the programme scope or 
support level if the market is viewed as delivering sub-optimal 
outcomes, or is being over-generous. The removal of support 
for the distribution of compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs) 
under CERT and several reviews to adjust support levels under 
the RO are examples of such interventions. If successful, these 
programmes become familiar to participants and investors, 
enabling markets and employment to grow. Any fundamental 
change in policy can therefore prove disruptive to the market-
place and must be considered carefully.
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This paper considers the energy policy changes that the UK 
government is currently making within the RO and CERT pro-
grammes identified above. Regarding the former, Government 
is implementing a suite of policies under the banner of Electric-
ity Market Reform (EMR). As part of EMR, support of renew-
able electricity generators will change from the RO (a quantity-
based green certificate mechanism) to a system of contracts for 
difference feed-in-tariffs (CfD FIT). 
Regarding energy efficiency programmes, whilst much of 
Europe is turning to supplier obligations in order to compel 
energy companies to deliver energy efficiency, the UK, after 
18 years of using such schemes, will from 2013 have a financ-
ing scheme (Green Deal) as the central delivery mechanism, 
relying fully on the market rather than government interven-
tion. The remaining supplier obligation (the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO)) will focus on the areas that financing is 
not expected to fully support: more expensive insulation and 
help for those with no access to finance. In addition, the UK’s 
publicly funded fuel poverty policy is to be terminated: for the 
first time since 1978, there will be no taxpayer funded energy 
efficiency programme for the most vulnerable. These changes 
represent the biggest shift in the history of energy efficiency 
policy in the UK. 
Whilst these authors may question the efficacy of some of 
these policy developments, this paper instead focussed on the 
nature of the transitional periods being employed in order to 
draw lessons for policymakers in future: We suggest that more 
extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders, trialling new 
policies prior to full implementation and gradual tapering out 
of established policy instruments can mitigate against any neg-
ative impacts resulting from policy reform in energy demand 
and supply.
Reforms	and	policy	amnesia
Ideally, when deciding to implement new policy instruments, 
governments would look at current policy landscape, consider 
its past successes and failures, and carefully reflect the appro-
priate pace at which new policies are to be introduced. In real-
ity, however, this rarely happens.
In his book ‘Politics in time’ Paul Pierson convincingly illus-
trates that a lot of social science focuses on immediate political 
and policy outcomes and more or less ignores the dimension 
of time – the impact of the past on the present and the future 
(Pierson, 2004). Similar arguments have been put forward by 
the historian Eric Hobsbawm who claims that not only social 
science but also ‘policymaking and planning have pursued a 
model of scientism and technical manipulation which system-
atically, and deliberately, neglects […] historical experience’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1998, p. aa). There is evidence that this applies 
across the policy spectrum including areas such as health poli-
cy (Pollitt, 2008), anti-terrorism policy (Field, 2009), education 
policy (Hargreaves and Goodson, 2006), environmental policy 
(Dovers, 2000), urban policy (Shaw and Robinson 1998), and 
fuel poverty policy (Higgins and Lutzenhiser, 1995).
Hence, rather than being conscious of the past, policy mak-
ing can often be characterised by ‘ad hocery’ and ‘policy amne-
sia’ (Dovers, 2000, p. 140). With limited institutional memories, 
it is not surprising that historical experience is not considered 
in its entirety – memory only goes back that far. But even quite 
recent experience and the lessons that could be learned from it 
are ‘too often overlooked in the rush of near term imperatives, 
expediencies and policy fashion’ (ibid). This is because ‘conven-
tional political processes often block learning because ideology 
overrides evidence’ (Metcalfe, 1993, p. 302). 
Ignoring the past, however, can have significant impacts on 
the durability and sustainability of future policy. The failure to 
recognise and learn from the successes and blunders of the past 
often leads to badly informed decisions and policies, which do 
not achieve what they were designed for. This phenomenon 
has been coined the ‘implementation gap’ (Marsh and Rhodes, 
1992) and evidence shows its regular occurrence (Ferman, 
1989). Unsuccessful reform, in return, can lead to cynicism and 
there is a danger that future policy alterations will face a high 
degree of scepticism making further reforms difficult to achieve 
(Patashnik, 2008).
Due to the ‘tendency to be dazzled by a particular technology 
or method’ (Grabosky, 1995, p. 363), governments frequently 
introduce new policy instruments paying insufficient attention 
to the legacy of the existing instrument portfolio. We illustrate 
in the following that this phenomenon appears to occur in the 
context of current policy reforms of energy demand and supply 
policies in the UK.
UK	demand	side	policy	–	Green	Deal
POLICY	MIX	BEFORE	AND	AFTER
Traditionally, domestic demand side policy in the UK incen-
tivising energy efficiency improvements consisted of a port-
folio involving regulations (such as for new buildings and 
major alterations of existing buildings), taxpayer funded grant 
programmes (including Warm Front and similar programmes 
in the devolved administrations), and, most importantly in 
terms of scale, energy or carbon savings obligations (the Car-
bon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and its predecessors 
(Rosenow, 2012). All of the above require a high degree of gov-
ernment intervention – in case of building regulations the gov-
ernment defines the minimum energy performance standards, 
grant programmes are funded by public expenditure adminis-
tered by government, and although energy savings obligations 
put the onus on energy companies, it is the government setting 
the targets and specifications of delivery. Most effort was di-
rected towards take-up of low cost energy efficiency measures 
such as efficient boilers, cavity and loft insulation. The result 
has been remarkable – from 2004 to 2011 not for temperature 
corrected domestic gas consumption decreased on average by 
5 % per year (DECC, 2012c), our own calculations show that if 
temperature corrected the figure is about 3.6 %. Most of this re-
duction relates to energy efficiency improvements (Centre for 
Economics and Business Research, 2011) largely triggered by 
the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) 1, EEC 2, and CERT. 
Despite the apparent success, the UK government decided 
to radically overhaul the existing system at an unprecedented 
pace. Energy savings obligations will be directed towards high 
cost measures such as solid wall insulation, even though inter-
national experience has been to use such obligations mainly 
for low cost measures (Eyre et al., 2009; York, 2008). Almost 
all support for low cost measures is supposed to come through 
the Green Deal, the new flagship programme for building re-
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furbishment. The Green Deal is an on-bill finance mechanism 
and allows loans for investment in energy efficiency measures 
to be attached to the property rather than the owner (Rosenow 
and Eyre, 2012). Also, for the first time since 1978, there will be 
no taxpayer funded energy efficiency programme for the most 
vulnerable. The only remaining fuel poverty policy consists of 
provisions for low-income households in the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO), the current energy savings obligation in 
place.
Overall, the Green Deal determines the policy landscape: 
Because of its Golden Rule, which prescribes that cost savings 
from energy efficiency measures must be larger than the invest-
ment, only low cost technologies are eligible. Low cost meas-
ures were previously targeted by energy savings obligations, a 
quantity based instrument, where the outcomes are more or 
less certain. In contrast, the Green Deal does not require a spe-
cific level of delivery, it is left entirely to the market and the 
outcomes are uncertain. The implications are profound. We 
analyse the proposals regarding their effect on carbon savings, 
fuel poverty, and the supply chain.
TRANSITION	IMPACTS:
Carbon	savings	implications
Projections for the Green Deal of expected carbons savings are 
provided by the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) in the Impact Assessment of the Green Deal and the 
Energy Company Obligation and indicate that the impact on 
carbon reduction will be significantly below past policies. Such 
projections are, of course, subject to various challenges and 
based on various assumptions. However, they provide a guess-
timate which indicates the degree of the policy’s efficacy.
The Impact Assessment estimates that by 2022 the Green 
Deal and the Energy Company Obligation together will result 
in savings of 84 million tons of non-traded (emissions not cov-
ered by EU ETS) CO2 (lifetime) and 44 million tons of traded 
(emissions covered by EU ETS) CO2 (lifetime) (DECC, 2012d). 
This equates to 12.8 million tons of CO2 (lifetime) per year. 
Compared to the existing policies ECO and the Green Deal will 
result in significantly lower carbon savings. Per year, current 
policies (CERT and CESP) deliver about 68 million tons CO2 
(lifetime) in savings (based on DECC, 2009a; DECC, 2010a). 
Hence, over the period 2013–2022, the Green Deal and ECO 
will only deliver 19 % of the carbon savings that the current 
policies (years 2009–2012) achieve.
There are a number of factors that contribute to the reduc-
tion:
1. The estimates of savings from individual measures are lower 
now than in CERT, e.g. 2.67 MWh/year for cavity wall insu-
lation (CWI) compared to an estimate of 3.54 in MWh/year 
in CERT. This is due to a change in methodology, from an 
approach that may lead to an over-estimate to one likely to 
produce an under-estimate. 
2. ECO and Green Deal are focused on buildings, so that the 
lighting and appliance measures which contributed signifi-
cantly to CERT, and even more to earlier obligations, are 
not included (although the non-domestic part of the Green 
Deal includes some lighting measures).
3. Last, but probably most important, there is a significant re-
duction in the projected rate of installation of key insulation 
measures – cavity wall insulation and loft insulation – which 
is not compensated for by rising rates of solid wall insulation 
(SWI). This is driven by excluding standard CWI and loft 
insulation from the Carbon Saving obligation.
However, there are a number of caveats to this comparison:
1. During the first 4 years of CERT 21.4 % of savings were 
delivered from lighting measures which included mainly 
CFLs. After almost 300 million CFLs had been distributed 
(DECC, 2010b), CFLs ceased to be eligible under CERT 
because of concerns that savings from CFLs might not be 
additional any longer because those might not have been 
installed (OFGEM, 2011). Hence, part of the accredited 
savings need to be deducted to allow for a more accurate 
comparison. Given that CFLs are no longer eligible and that 
82.5 % of the total obligation had been delivered at the end 
of year 4, the contribution to the total savings at the end of 
the scheme will be 17.7 %. Deducting all of the CFL savings, 
the Green Deal and ECO achieve 22.6 % of the policies in 
place before 2013, CERT and CESP.
2. The Green Deal savings include a large share of savings from 
the non-domestic sector, about 38 % are projected to result 
from measures being delivered in this sector (DECC, 2013). 
However, CERT and CESP did not include any non-domes-
tic sector savings.
Although it is not possible to determine the exact size of the 
actual reduction in terms of policy effort, the analysis above 
shows that it is substantial.
Fuel	poverty	implications
As illustrated above, the only significant fuel poverty policy will 
be the ECO, an energy savings obligation. Such programmes 
were never intended for reducing fuel poverty and primarily 
geared towards energy and carbon savings. Using energy sav-
ings obligations for fuel poverty alleviation unavoidably creates 
tensions (Rosenow et al., 2012). Raising revenues for energy 
efficiency programmes via the energy bill, which is the case 
with energy savings obligations, is by default regressive if cost 
pass through is unregulated (ACE, 2011). Historically, regres-
sive impacts were counterbalanced by progressive delivery of 
measures by allocating a large proportion (currently 40 %) to 
low income customers. A comprehensive analysis of the extent 
to which this has been achieved is missing, but given that most 
households received energy efficiency measures in the past 
and that these were generally highly cost effective, all income 
groups benefitted. Moreover, at least until 2008, contributions 
from households were relatively small with €3 and €7 per cus-
tomer per fuel per annum in 2002–2005 and 2005–2008 re-
spectively (Lees, 2006, 2008), potential eff ects for those house-
holds who did not benefit from the obligations were likely to be 
low. An evaluation of the cost to households of the last obliga-
tion period (2008–2012) is missing, but government estimates 
illustrated that they are likely to be around €58 (DECC, 2009b, 
2010a; DEFRA, 2008).
With the design of ECO, the situation is different for a 
number of reasons. First, although the UK government pre-
dicts that the overall cost of the programme will be similar 
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to current contributions made by consumers, the actual cost 
are likely to be much higher than past obligations (NERA, 
2012; Platt et al., 2012; Rosenow et al., 2012). This exacerbates 
the regressive impacts on the revenue raising side. Second, 
ECO will focus on high cost measures such as solid wall in-
sulation and hard-to-treat cavity wall insulation. Therefore a 
smaller number of households will receive energy efficiency 
measures reducing the number of those who benefit and in-
creasing the proportion of consumers who pay but do not 
receive any measures. Third, the provisions in the ECO are 
weak in terms of their targeting of low income groups. The 
Affordable Warmth obligation, defined as lifetime energy cost 
savings within a group of low-income customers on certain 
benefits, is designed in a way that only 37.2 % of measures will 
be delivered in fuel poor homes. Only 26.9 % of the benefits 
of the second fuel poverty element in ECO, the Carbon Sav-
ings Communities obligation, reaches fuel poor households 
(Probert et al., 2012).
As a result, the effect on fuel poverty reduction is lim-
ited: The Government has stated that the ECO will result in 
125,000 to 250,000 households being taken out of fuel poverty 
by 2023 when ECO is supposed to conclude and does no longer 
add costs to household energy bills and all measures have been 
installed (DECC, 2012d). The number of households in fuel 
poverty according to the current definition is 20 to 40 times this 
figure (DECC, 2012b). Assuming the same eff ort continued af-
ter 2023, it would take 200–400 years to take all households out 
of fuel poverty.
Employment	effects
DECC, instead, stress that under the Green Deal and ECO by 
2015 the number of jobs will have increased from 26,000 in 
2012 to 60,000 in 2015, i.e. an increase of 130 % (DECC, 2012f). 
This figure is, however, the upper estimate, the lower estimate is 
frequently left out. The upper estimate is based on the assump-
tion that there will be almost 10,000 installers of insulation in 
2015 and that for each installer an additional 4.75 jobs in the 
supply chain are created (DECC, 2012d). The ratio of installers 
to supply chain jobs, or direct to indirect employment effects, 
is based on a study commissioned by government assessing 
the UK market for low carbon and environmental goods and 
services (Innovas, 2009). Th e lower estimate results from us-
ing a ratio of job to capital spending for housing repair and 
maintenance provided by Construction Skills (the Sector Skills 
Council for construction). This estimated ratio of job to capi-
tal spending for housing repair and maintenance is 32.6 jobs 
per £1m (€1.2m in 2012 prices) output. Assumed total capital 
investment in 2015 of around £1.08b (€1.3b in 2012 prices) re-
sults in 35,000 jobs in the whole of the insulation industry (di-
rect and indirect employment effects). A further 3,500 Green 
Deal Assessors are added to this.
The insulation industry claims that the plans for the Green 
Deal and the ECO will cause job losses of 16,000 in 2013 (Insu-
lation Industry Forum, 2012). This claim is based on a report 
produced by the Association for the Conservation of Energy 
(ACE, 2012a), which concludes that employment figures will 
decrease rather than increase. ACE use more or less the same 
method for establishing a high and a low estimate as DECC. 
An important difference between the government’s assess-
ment and the figures produced by ACE is that the figures for 
the status-quo, i.e. the reference point, differ significantly. 
DECC claim that in 2012 there were 26,000 jobs in the insula-
tion industry and its supply chain, ACE provide a much high-
er estimate of 44,988–56,829 based on the number of meas-
ures likely to be delivered by CERT and CESP (ACE, 2012b). 
It is unclear how DECC arrive at the figure of 26,000 jobs in 
2012, but in the impact assessment of the Green Deal and 
the ECO, DECC compares the expected uptake to the year 
2007, when there were 4,700 installers i.e. about 27,000 to-
tal jobs when applying the 4.75 factor used for including the 
supply chain jobs. It seems that DECC compare the projected 
number of jobs to 2007 levels. This approach is deeply flawed 
given that the CERT target in the period of 2008–2012 was 
2.4 times higher than it was in the previous obligation period. 
While the exact number of jobs in 2012 is unknown, it is likely 
to be above 40,000 given the significantly higher targets in 
place after 2008.
ACE’s lower estimate for the years post-2012 are based on 
the number of measures projected by government, the as-
sumed capital expenditure of those, and the same ratio as used 
by DECC of 32.6 jobs per £1m (€1.2m in 2012 prices) output. 
The higher estimate is calculated by converting the number of 
days required in order to deliver the number of measures pro-
jected by DECC into full time job equivalents. Using the same 
method as DECC, ACE applies the 4.75 factor for the supply 
chain resulting in the total number of jobs. Both methods show 
a decrease in the number of jobs of about 20 % by 2015. This 
is because of the reference point in the year 2012, which is, as 
described above, much higher in ACE’s analysis.
Research commissioned for Knauf Insulation estimates that 
initial job losses would account for only 3,000 in the loft and 
cavity wall insulation business with rising employment figures 
for solid wall insulation offsetting some of the loss (Europe 
Economics, 2012). This research does not, however, support 
DECC’s claims of steeply rising employment figures after 2012.
DIFFERENCE	UNDER	A	MORE	SUSTAINABLE	TRANSITION
Whilst we can have some confidence that the suppliers will 
achieve the targets set them under the Energy Company Obli-
gation, the big uncertainty with the delivery of energy efficien-
cy under the new policy-mix is the likely success or otherwise 
of the Green Deal.
Never before has a financing mechanism without additional 
subsidies been the centrepiece of a national government’s en-
ergy efficiency programme. The most prominent loan pro-
grammes such as the CO2-Building Rehabilitation Programme 
in Germany received substantial amounts of public funding 
to lower the interest rates (Rosenow, in press). Whilst finance 
mechanisms without additional subsidies such as the Green 
Deal have been used before, particularly across the US, they 
have always been introduced as an option and never achieved 
mass take up. 
Much will depend on the nature of the offers to households 
and businesses, the ease of the accessing the scheme, the ac-
ceptance of a Green Deal charge on the deeds by the housing 
market, and accompanying incentives and regulations put in 
place, and the degree to which Government and industry can 
encourage take-up via marketing. At present, it is highly un-
certain how many households and businesses will want to take 
up Green Deal, or through which business models it will be 
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delivered. Such uncertainty may create opportunities for new 
entrants and therefore generate some useful innovation. But, in 
the short term, it is anathema to the businesses and industries 
that have been built up around the relatively predicable supplier 
obligations.
ACE (2012b) in 2012 suggested a potential solution that 
would enable Green Deal and ECO to launch, whilst giving 
the industry more confidence over the continued delivery of 
lower-cost energy efficiency measures. Their proposal centred 
on allowing the low-cost measures to contribute to the ECO to 
a limited extent and for a limited period, regardless of whether 
the measures had been financed through the Green Deal by 
the consumer, or through the conventionally supplier obli-
gation subsidy. Were the Green Deal to prove successful and 
most measures installed via that mechanism, these measures 
could be removed from the supplier obligation. Conversely, if 
the Green Deal failed to gain interest, Government would be 
able to amend the offering without the negative impact on the 
delivery of energy efficiency measures and industry jobs that 
would otherwise ensue.
UK	generation	policy	–	Electricity	Market	Reform
At the same time as implementing sweeping changes to the way 
in which energy saving measures are funded and delivered, the 
Government is undertaking the most fundamental reforms to 
the electricity market since liberalisation in the 1990s. Again, 
transitions between the existing and forthcoming suite of poli-
cies will be crucial to sustaining the confidence of existing in-
vestors, and attracting further investment in new electricity 
infrastructure.
POLICY	MIX	BEFORE	AND	AFTER
Current	policy	mix
At present, the UK electricity market can be thought of as an 
energy-only market with additional support for renewable gen-
eration. Power is typically traded directly between suppliers 
and generators through a mixture of over-the-counter trades 
and short-term auctions. The majority of electricity is traded 
between generators and suppliers within the same company 
group, so that in practice the market is dominated by verti-
cally integrated companies, with other companies exposed to 
higher price risks (OFGEM, 2012b). After gate-closure (one 
hour before delivery) the system operator balances supply and 
demand through a system of Bid-Offer Acceptances. Imbalance 
is settled post-delivery at the prevailing imbalance prices, and 
are dependent on whether both the generator (or supplier) and 
market overall are short or long in contracted supply (or de-
mand). Under these arrangements, future capacity constraints 
are expected to produce high prices in forward markets, signal-
ling higher returns and profitable conditions for further invest-
ment in capacity.
The Renewables Obligation (RO) was introduced in 2001 to 
encourage the development of renewable electricity, and more 
latterly ensure sufficient generation for the UK to meet its EU 
renewable energy targets. Under the RO, accredited renew-
able generators sell their power on the market and in addition 
receive a Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) for each 
MWh of electricity they generate. Each year energy suppliers 
are required to surrender sufficient ROCs to cover a defined 
proportion of the energy supplied, or pay a ‘buy-out’ price to 
cover any shortfall. The ‘buy-out’ receipts are returned to sup-
pliers in proportion to the number of ROCs they surrendered; 
meaning the value of a ROC is the value of the ‘buy-out’ price 
plus the recycled revenues (OFGEM, 2012a). 
Rationale	for	change	and	new	policy	mix
Government have concerns that the existing market arrange-
ments will not deliver upon their energy objectives: to deliver 
secure, low carbon energy to consumers at lowest cost (DECC, 
Electricity Market Reform: policy overview). They believe the 
existing electricity market provides insufficient certainty to 
new investment in either low carbon generation or flexible 
thermal capacity to ensure secure supplies, whilst the current 
prices of carbon and coal risks the construction of new una-
bated coal generators with high carbon emissions. They view 
the certificate-based RO as a relatively expensive way of decar-
bonising, with no support being offered to other low carbon 
generators, notably nuclear and CCS. 
As a result, in the White Paper of July 2011 (DECC, 2011a) 
and the Technical Update of December 2011 (DECC, 2011b) 
they set out proposals to introduce a series of policies known 
collectively as Electricity Market Reform (EMR). EMR consists 
of four key components:
1. Carbon floor price.
2. Capacity Mechanism.
3. Emissions performance standard.
4. Feed-in-Tariffs with Contracts for Difference.
1–3 above are new interventions that seek to prevent additional 
unabated coal plant, increase the price of carbon for develop-
ers when making investment decisions, and ensure adequate 
electricity capacity. Since they are new additions to the policy 
mix rather than evolutions from existing policies, they are not 
considered further within this paper. 
Item  4, is of most interest when considering transitions. 
Government plans to replace the current support mechanism 
for renewable electricity – the RO – with a system of Feed-in-
Tariffs with Contracts for Difference (CfDs) (DECC, 2012a). 
CfDs are a form of feed-in-tariffs that continue to incentivise 
generators to sell their output in the electricity market. Pay-
ments are based around two prices:
• A strike price, which is the net price that a generator would 
hope to achieve for each unit of power, and
• A reference price, which is the price that the generator 
would likely receive for power sold on the market.
Under CfD, a generator would sell their output on the market 
and receive (or repay) a CfD payment in addition. The CfD 
payment would equal the difference between the strike price 
and the reference price: where the strike price exceeds the ref-
erence price, the generator receives a top-up payment; where 
the reference price exceeds the strike price, the generator will 
make a repayment of the difference. As a result, the generator 
has greater certainty over future revenue streams than under 
the RO where wholesale prices and (to a lesser degree) ROC 
prices fluctuate. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the difference in revenue that a generator 
might receive under the RO and the CfD support, with Table 1 
outlining some of the key differences between the policies.
POLICY	TRANSITION	
Throughout the development of EMR policy, and in contrast 
to the policies on the demand-side, the UK Government has 
repeatedly stated that “it is essential that the period of transi-
tion between the current and new market arrangements runs 
smoothly and allows investment to continue” (DECC, 2011a). 
In order to foster this smooth transition, Government allowed 
for an overlap between the point at which developers can se-
cure CfD contracts – beginning in August 2014 – and the point 
at which the RO is closed to new entrants – 31st March 2017 – as 
illustrated in Figure 2.
This apparent 32 month transition is not as long in practice 
owing to the differences in the nature of the two schemes. The 
RO cannot be entered into until at least part of the generation is 
commissioned – that is, constructed and generating electricity. 
By contrast, Government intends, and indeed project financers 
will require, that developers secure a CfD well before construc-
tion begins, else they risk developing without guaranteed access 
to financial support. 
This risk becomes rather more real once the Treasury’s cap 
on support – the Levy Control Framework (LCF) – is consid-
ered (HM Treasury, 2011). Once this cap is reached, no further 
CfDs will be issued to developers, making it crucial that a con-
tract is secured early in the development process. Government 
have indicated the LCF will limit support for low carbon elec-
tricity generation to £7.6bn (€8.7bn) by 2020 (in 2012 prices) 
(DECC, 2012e).
Furthermore, it is expected that Government would aim for 
CfDs to be less generous (though more stable) than under the 
existing RO in their support, as part of the long term plan to 
phase out subsidies. As a result, any CfDs awarded in 2014 are 
highly likely to be for assets that are pre-construction and not 
expected to be able to meet the deadline for acceptance into 
the RO. 
Table	1.	Key	differences	of	support	for	generators	under	the	RO	and	CfD.
 RO CfD 
Eligibility -Most renewable electricity generators  -New generation that would have been eligible for 
the RO plus nuclear and CCS 
Wholesale price -Exposed to fluctuations, though utilities have 
developed vertical integration and complex 
hedging strategies to mitigate risks 
-CfD provides natural hedge against wholesale 
price risk 
Magnitude of policy 
support 
-Value of ROC is fairly stable around the buy-out 
price with limited risk of oversupply 
-ROC price is set by the market  
-Will vary inversely with the wholesale price. 
-Strike prices set administratively by DECC 
initially, before moving to technology specific 
auctions. 
Length of support -20 years -Likely to be 15 years for renewable generators 
Contract awarded -After the commissioning of the first turbine -Once applied for. Could be as soon as planning 
permission and promise of grid connection have 
been achieved. Earlier contract could increase 
risks. 
Penalties -Plant can be fined or ROCs revoked for 
misdemeanours 
-Failure to commission on time or meet milestones 
can ultimately result in CfD termination 
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Figure 1. Illustrating the difference in revenue structure based on wholesale price and support mechanism under the RO (green) and CfD 
(blue). Whereas the RO provides a relatively stable premium above a variable market price, the CfD support balances the market price to 
give a stable revenue set at the strike price.
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The shift from ‘support on completion’ to ‘contract for sup-
port pre-construction’ means that in practice the transitional 
period differs for different technologies, and essentially disap-
pears for technologies that would seek to secure a CfD contract 
three or more years prior to project completion. This would 
be the case for Offshore wind projects in particular: the long 
lead times mean that projects currently developed might not 
be commissioned in time to meet the closure of the RO, yet at 
present lack any certainty around the level and availability of 
support through CfDs. For such projects, there is no transi-
tional period to speak of.
In order to support those sites currently being developed 
that require confidence over support levels now, yet have lead 
times such that they will not be commissioned until after April 
2017, Government have put in place Investment Instruments 
to offer some certainty. These are bilateral contacts between a 
developer and Government which offer certainty on access to 
support under CfD before the contracts are launched in 2014. 
Even so, these contracts have to be negotiated directly with 
Government, cannot be signed until the primary legislation 
clears Parliament, and does not overcome the risks associated 
with the unfamiliarity of a radically different support mecha-
nism.
Continued	uncertainties
The appropriateness of the transitional period is further com-
plicated by the numerous aspects that remain to be confirmed 
by Government concerning the details of the CfD and even 
their legality. At present, developers and investors have no sight 
of the likely strike-prices for supported technologies; do not 
know how the CfDs will be allocated beyond an initial first-
come, first-served period; are unsure of how long they will have 
to commission their plant before the length of their support 
begins to reduce (the length of the ‘target commissioning win-
dow’) or the contract is cancelled (the ‘longstop date’); whether 
support will be fully or partially indexed; or whether a refinanc-
ing clause will be included by Government. Further, there is 
no certainty that CfDs will be approved under State Aid rules 
by the European Commission, particularly as they go beyond 
the RO in offering support to nuclear power. With much detail 
yet to be confirmed and timescales tight, it is very possible that 
the commencement of CfD contracts could slip, reducing the 
period of transition still further.
It is clear that developers and investors will have to wait until 
at least 2014 to see the CfD allocation mechanism in operation, 
and longer still (once these projects are commissioned) before 
they get sight of the payment flows in operation.
IMPACTS
The relatively early stage of the EMR reforms compared to 
those on the demand-side means that it is difficult to gauge the 
impact of the transition process as proposed. It is clear however 
that such a radical change in the manner of support for renew-
able electricity generation will require a period of time before 
developers and investors have confidence in the policies, and 
that policy development has been undertaken with a high level 
of awareness of these risks. 
Even at this early stage, the policy proposals are leading to 
headlines citing an investment hiatus due to a lack of sufficient 
transition. Some organisations are calling for the extension of 
the Renewables Obligation to 2020 to create a longer period of 
overlap (e.g. REA, 2012), whilst market analysts have down-
graded the position of the UK in terms of the environment for 
renewable energy investment (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
Synthesis/Discussion
Any change in support mechanism is an opportunity to change 
the level of support, and there are interested parties on all sides 
that might wish to see those support levels adjusted in either 
direction. Those receiving support will therefore seek to en-
sure that the level of support is maintained or increased during 
the change. The level of transition is an area where parties can 
claim to be negatively impacted, in the hope that such argu-
ments will preserve the existing schemes for longer, or ensure 
a greater level of support as compensation under the scheme 
that follows. With this in mind, it is important to treat claims 
with some caution. 
Whilst some aspects of policy reform, notably the carbon 
floor price, affect both energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
the two reform packages have been undertaken by separate 
officials at different times in different parts of the same Gov-
ernment department (the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, DECC). It is clear that there has been relatively lit-
tle interaction between the two. The supply side reform shows 
greater willingness to intervene in markets, recognising the dif-
ficulties of securing transformational change in a fee market 
system. On the other hand, the demand side reform involves 
the reverse – the return to an approach with more faith in the 
market to deliver energy efficiency.
More specifically, the Green Deal energy efficiency package 
is poorly integrated with the separate proposals for encourag-
ing renewable heat in households, with the latter reliant on 
a new incentive scheme (the Renewable Heat Incentive) and 
small scale FITS introduced just as incentives for most energy 
 
 Figure 2. There exists a 32 month transition between the start of CfD contracts and the closure of the RO to new entrants.
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efficiency technologies are phased out. And the electricity mar-
ket reform proposals place minimal emphasis on energy effi-
ciency. In particular they neglect the option of paying a feed-in 
tariff for energy saving or efficiency despite a recent literature 
on this (Benton, 2011; Bertoldi, 2009; Eyre, 2013). The ‘non-
joined-up’ approach is evident form the inclusion of this idea 
in a separate consultation on electricity demand reduction pub-
lished alongside the electricity market reform proposals. This 
consultation also includes the option of a supplier obligation 
for electricity efficiency, somewhat strangely as the consulta-
tion period includes the date of the end of CERT – the point at 
which provision for most electricity saving options in supplier 
obligations is terminated. 
Moreover, DECC is generally not allowing a sufficient pe-
riod of transition across all policies. On the supply side, the 
influence of the utilities and the relative importance placed on 
investment here by DECC has at least ensured some form of 
transition. However, for the demand side, the lack of any transi-
tion is an appallingly short-sighted approach that, through its 
impacts on industry, only manages to make it more difficult for 
their preferred policy mix to succeed. Potential policy failure 
bears the risk of increasing perceptions that energy efficiency is 
too difficult undermining the objectives of policy reform.
Conclusions
Generally, the introduction of innovative and less intervention-
ist instruments can potentially address the challenge of raising 
additional finance in times of constrained public budgets. How-
ever, because the consequences of a new policy are unknown at 
the policy design stage, Schofield (2004, p. 304) suggests that 
an important question is ‘what is the degree of allowable risk 
which the public themselves and those in the public sector are 
happy to tolerate in terms of not knowing the consequences of 
policy until it is actioned?’
One possibility of avoiding the risk of policy failure when 
introducing new and untested policy instruments is to follow 
a process of ‘staged implementation’ (Schneider and Ingram, 
1988, p. 72). Benefi ts of such an approach include the oppor-
tunity to monitor the effects of the policy and its contribution 
to the overall policy goals, to build up capacities within the im-
plementing agencies and regulated entities, and to understand 
how the new instrument interacts with the existing policy mix. 
At the same time, existing policies that have a history of suc-
cess (in the sense that they achieved their objectives) can be 
preserved as long as the new policy instrument proves effective.
The urgency with which energy security, rising bills and, in 
particular, climate change need to be addressed make it im-
portant that Government implement sensible and coherent 
energy policies. Yet that does not mean that policy changes 
should be rushed or abrupt. In fact this proves counterproduc-
tive. Allowing business, industry and Government themselves 
to understand a policy before revoking its predecessor is vital to 
breeding the confidence needed for investment – and in order 
to allow the evolution of the policy in the correct way. We urge 
decision makers in the UK and elsewhere to embrace the old 
adage: ‘more haste, less speed.’
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